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A Dozen Propositions on Private Property,




Property rights are a hot political topic. In the last few years, the issue
of regulatory "takings" of property has ceased to be merely a vastly over-
written subject in the legal academic literature. A "property rights" move-
ment - taking aim in particular at environmental legislation - seems to
have been energized by several new takings cases from the Supreme Court'
* Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Yale Law School.
This Paper was delivered October 4, 1995 as the Tohn Randolph Tucker Lecture to the fac-
ulty, students, and guests of the Washington and Lee University School of Law, whose com-
ments and questions were most insightful and useful. For helpful comments on earlier drafts,
I especially would like to thank Bruce Ackerman, Fred Bosselman, Peter Byrne, Daniel Esty,
Louise Halper, and Laura Underkuffler. Chris Kubiac provided valuable research assistance.
Errors, of course, are my own.
1. The Supreme Court held almost no regulations to be takings prior to the 1980s.
This trend began to change quite sharply in the 1980s, particularly after 1987. The major
cases finding actual or potential takings of property have been, in chronological order:
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438-39 (1982) (holding
physical invasion of property to be taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1987) (holding damages to be
appropriate remedy if taking occurs); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
834-42 (1987) (holding requirement of public access as condition for building permit to be
taking); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992) (holding
that regulation denying all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes taking unless state
can show that background principles of nuisance and property law prohibited proposed use);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2321-22 (1994) (holding requirement of public
easement as condition for building permit to be taking). But see Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 526-31 (1992) (holding rent control not to be physical taking of property);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-502 (1987) (holding
state mining law limiting rights to undermine surface not to be taking). On the emergence
of the property rights movement, see, e.g., Christopher Georges, Wider Property-Owner
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and, to a lesser extent, from a newly activist Court of Federal Claims.'
"Takings" bills are debated fiercely in Congress and in statehouses all over
the United States, as state and federal legislators entertain measures that
confront a pattern of regulation that is said to threaten private property
Although the congressional bills deal only with federal matters, and the
state measures deal with state and local regulation, most of these measures
follow one of three basic strategies. First, they may require regulatory
bodies or state officers to undertake assessment processes in an attempt to
determine whether their actions potentially "take" the property of private
parties. Second, they may attempt to redefine and expand what counts as a
"taking" of property. And third, they may implicitly or explicitly narrow
the defenses that regulatory bodies may raise when facing takings charges.
Taken together, these measures may considerably enlarge the range of public
acts that count as "takings" and, conversely, considerably contract the scope
of regulatory authority.
In this article, I will address some of the issues that these acts and pro-
posals raise, concentrating on the congressional bills because, if adopted,
these federal enactments may well serve as models for subsequent state leg-
islation.4 But more generally, I want to clarify some of the property con-
cepts that underlie takings jurisprudence. Because many of the proponents
Compensation May Prove a Costly Clause in the "Contract with America," WALL ST. J., Dec.
30, 1994, at A8; H. Jane Lehman, Owners Aren't Giving Ground in Property Battles (1st in
3 part series, "Whose Land Is It?," on the private property rights movement), CHI. TRm.,
Feb. 9, 1992, § 16 (Real Estate), at 1B, 1B-2B.
2. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990)
(finding application of wetlands regulation to be taking), aft'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
3. As of the fall of 1994, all state legislatures had considered, and 10 had enacted,
some version of takings legislation. Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Taking Legisla-
tion: Misguided and Dangerous, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1994, at 3, 3 & n.1.
The newly elected Congress also has taken up takings legislation; the House passed the
Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [herein-
after House Property Protection Act], on March 3, 1995, and the Senate is currently consid-
ering the Ommbus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [here-
inafter Senate Property Rights Act]. By 1995, more states had passed similar legislation,
including Florida, H.R. 863, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995) (enacted May 18, 1995), Texas,
S. 14, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995) (enacted June 12, 1995), and Virginia, S. 1017, 1994-95
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995) (enacted March 25, 1995), among others.
4. Takings assessment laws, the most common type among the state enactments, fol-
lowed this pattern. The general model for states was Executive Order 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554
(1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994), issued late in the Reagan administration, which
required federal agencies to assess the takings implications of proposed regulations. See
Freilich & Doyle, supra note 3, at 3.
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of takings legislation call on what they regard as the historic principles of a
more property-conscious past,5 I will concentrate on the common-law and
historical legal principles relating to takings and property regulation.
Briefly, my position is that historic Anglo-American legal principles did
indeed recognize the importance of private property rights, which are essen-
tial in a functioning free enterprise economy. But those principles also rec-
ognized what were called "public rights," particularly in resources that are
not easily turned into private property - historically, air, water resources,
and fish and wildlife stocks - because the management of such diffuse
resources is also essential in a functioning economic order of free enterprise.
Indeed, the essence of traditional takings law is an effort to balance private.
rights and public rights as they co-evolve over time. This balance is drawn
principally by judicial actions, but the judiciary historically has recognized
that legislatures have an important role to play, particularly in defining and
protecting public rights. What is most at risk in the new takings measures
is the tradition of public rights because, in their authors' anxiety to protect
private rights, the measures may lose sight of the complementary character
of public and private rights in any functioning property regime.
With that introduction, let me begin my Dozen Propositions - twelve
observations on private property, public rights, and the new takings legis-
lation.
Proposition 1.
Private property rights are essential in a free-enterprise regime.
Property's importance for capitalism has been recognized at least
since John Locke's famous discussion in his Second Treatise of Gov-
ernment,' a discussion on which both William Blackstone and Jeremy
5. See Regulatory Takings and Property Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter
Regulatory Takings] (statement of James W. Ely, Jr.) (arguing that American law and practice
historically was solicitous of private property); id. (Statement of Roger J. Marzulla) (arguing
that framers wished to protect property, which was under assault from environmental laws);
see also Roger Pilon, Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Society, 6 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y
165, 168-70 (1983) (arguing that modem restrictions on property subvert historically correct
principles of private property). More recently, Pilon testified in favor of the takings
legislation pending in the House of Representatives. Regulatory Takings, supra (statement
of Roger Pilon).
6. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIsEs oF GOvERNMENT 290, 292-96, 299-301, 350-51
(Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
7. 2 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-*4.
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Bentham s later elaborated. An owner must have reasonably secure expecta-
tions of continued ownership if he or she is going to expend efforts to
improve resources. Similarly, reasonably secure definitions of property are
essential to trade because trading partners must know who owns what in
order for their trades to mean anything.
These elementary building blocks of capitalism - encouragement to
labor and trade - are important reasons for the security of property, and
they are very widely recognized in the common law of property. Incentives
to labor, for example, arise in a classic nugget of property case law, Pierson
v. Post,9 where the dissenting Judge Livingston engaged the majority in a
lively debate about the way that property rights affect incentives to undertake
useful labor.'0 The underlying idea that Livingston expressed is one of the
most important arguments for property: People are much more likely to plan
carefully and work hard when they know that the fruits of their labors will
be secure to them in the form of property rights.
Proposition 2.
Although private property rights need to be reasonably secure, their
content can change with changing conditions.
Property rights in traditional law have never had fixed characteristics
that apply under all conditions and for all time." Indeed, it would be
undesirable and probably impossible for property rights to have such fixed
definitions. This point is recognized even by such libertarian writers as
Richard Epstein"Z and has been acknowledged by such a property-conscious
judge as Justice Scalia. 3
A chief reason why property rights change is that they are costly to
establish and maintain. At the most elementary level, it takes time, effort,
8. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Principles of the Civil Code)
pt. 1, chs. 7-9 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1987) (1789).
9. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
10. Id. at 180-82 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
11. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAkINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
178-79 (1995).
12. Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common Property, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS 17, 40 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds., 1994).
13. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (opinion
of Scalia, J.) (stating that owners expect property restrictions from newly enacted legislation);
see also id. at 1016-17 n.7 (speculating that defining relevant property for takings cases
depends on how owners' expectations "have been shaped by the State's law of property")
(emphasis added).
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and resources to put a fence around a yard. More complex systems of
property rights, like copyright, require more effort and expense to establish
and enforce. Because property regimes are not costless, people often do not
define property rights at all until the need becomes clear; generally speaking,
people do so only when resources become scarce, raising the prospect of
damaging conflicts over resource use. An important way to prevent those
conflicts is to define property rights.
There is nothing particularly new about the observation that property
rights only arise with scarcity. Both Locke and Blackstone gave plausible
(though no doubt mythical) narrative versions of the origins of property
rights.14 In these narratives, people did not bother to assert any but the most
rudimentary property rights when natural foodstuffs were plentiful; they only
created property rights when the relevant resources became more scarce and
when people became more concerned about preserving their investments in
those resources. As Blackstone put it, human beings arrived at the point at
which the "earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities,
without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it,
if another might ... seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art,
and labour?"15 Scarcity and the need to encourage resource management,
then, gave rise to the effort to create property regimes.
Whether or not Locke's and Blackstone's accounts were historically
accurate, the pattern they described is typical in the development of common-
law property rights. For example, in the American West, grassland rights
were only very loosely defined in the early years of European settlement,
when the supply of grass seemed limitless. But private property in grasslands
became much more sharply defined as more settlers arrived with more
grazing animals, which of course brought the possibilities for strife among
settlers and overuse in the grazing areas and raised the need for more careful
management.16 In fact, the United States finally closed off the grasslands
to further free use and instead instituted a grazing permit system - a kind
of leasing arrangement that was supposed to eliminate both settler strife and
overuse of the grassland areas. 7 But in recent years, new conflicts have
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *2-*8; LOCKE, supra note 6, §§ 27-33, 36-38.
15. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *7.
16. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 169-71 (1975); George C. Coggins & Margaret
Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management 11: The Commons and the
Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 3, 28-35 (1982).
17. See PHILLIP O. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3-4, 34-35 (1960) (arguing inevitability of overgrazing on "free" land);
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pitted established grazing interests against environmentalists and recreational
users who complain that the grazing permit system takes insufficient account
of the impact that stock foraging has on the environment. Although change
is strongly resisted by grazing interests, these complaints suggest that existing
definitions of rights do not fully account for the full array of interests in the
grasslands, and if we are to avoid further conflict, we may need another
redefinition of grassland rights in the West.'"
Grassland rights illustrate the general pattern of change in property, a
pattern that responds to the benefits and costs of establishing, defining, and
protecting property rights. Unrestricted open access is not a problem when
resources are plentiful, but where congestion increases, open-access resources
may deteriorate - a situation often called "the tragedy of the commons. "19
People very often respond to this congestion and strife by dividing open-
access resources into individual private property holdings, as some of the
ranchers did on the western lands.
Proposition 3.
Some resources are candidates for public rights and management.
Private property is an important response to scarcity, congestion, and
strife, but it is not always the only response or the best one. Some scarce
resources require larger-scale management, even public management - a fact
that has been recognized in the common law of property. The use of
waterways, for example, has been considered a public property right since
the time of the Romans and, to a lesser degree, so have fisheries.2'
id. at 58-65, 69, 71-72 (describing Taylor Grazing Act and noting its somewhat stabilizing
effect on grazing lands); see also Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 16, at 40-41
(describing Taylor Grazing Act and noting its favoritism to ranchers).
18. See Foss, supra note 17, at 138 (describing early, though somewhat ineffective,
complaints of wildlife interests); George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland V: Pre-
scriptions for Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497, 526-34, 538-41 (1984) (proposing variety of
reforms, including range rehabilitation to benefit nonranching rangeland uses); Coggins &
Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 16, at 94-100 (describing growing conflicts between ranchers
and other interests). For some of the current controversies, see, e.g., Timothy Egan, In
Battle over Public Lands, Ranchers Push Public Aside, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at Al
(describing ranchers' counterattack on Interior Secretary's efforts to reduce overgrazing).
19. This name comes from Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968). An earlier development of the idea is found in H. Scott Gordon, The Economic
Theory of a Common-Propeny Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
20. Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 ,U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 713-14, 747-49 (1986).
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The reason for these common or public rights relates to the costs of
establishing property rights: It is more difficult to define individual property
rights in some resources than others. Land is a resource in which it is
relatively easy to define individual property rights. Land is fixed in location
and can be visibly marked, and trespassers can be identified relatively
easily - though certainly not without cost, as our modem security systems
attest. On the other hand, flowing water is considerably more difficult to
reduce to individual property because it moves around and cannot be so easily
designated as belonging to one person or another. Underground waters are
more difficult still because their movements are hidden and because it is
difficult to ascertain who else might be tapping into a given aquifer or what
kinds of activities might be polluting it. Stocks of wild animals and fish are
as difficult as groundwater or surface waters; even though individual animals
or fish can be taken by individual people, the maintenance of the stock as a
whole can be quite difficult because the animals migrate out of individual
owners' boundaries and because poaching may not be easy to police or even
to observe. Perhaps the most difficult resource to capture in private property
is air, which can easily be turned into a medium for pollution and noise
affecting many people.
The difficulty of defining and enforcing private property rights in water,
wildlife, and air did not and does not now mean that these resources are not
valuable but simply that they are not necessarily best treated as individual or
pivate property rights. In traditional American law, these diffuse resources
were often treated as limited common rights. For example, all the owners
of land along flowing rivers had limited use rights in the river, particularly
for stock watering and, to a certain extent, for waterpower; indeed, the uses
of these "limited commons" were the subjects of the riparian system of water
rights that developed in the early and mid-nineteenth century.2
Sometimes diffusely enjoyed resources were designated as "public
rights." This designation reflected the fact that although a resource could not
easily be privatized, it was nevertheless valuable to many people and subject
to a kind of easement for public use, including passive uses such as simple
enjoyment of clean air and quiet surroundings.' Not surprisingly, the
21. See generally Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990).
22. See Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal His-
tory, 72 CAL. L. REV. 217, 221-27 (1984) (arguing that 19th century American law was
replete with "public rights," characterized as property rights); Molly Selvin, The Public Trust
Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 1403, 1428-
34 (same). Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
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subjects of public rights often were associated with water, air, and wildlife.
The assignment of public rights in these resources meant ,that they were
generally available to the public at large but subject to conditions akin to
"reasonable use" in riparian law. The chief condition was that no particular
person could encroach on the rights of others by appropriating an undue
amount to himself or herself - in the forms of pollution, noise, overuse,
damage to fish habitat, blocking roads or navigation lanes, and so forth.'
Proposition 4.
Private land ownership often entails the use ofpublic resources.
Private ownership, particularly land ownership, has a close connection
with common and public resource uses. When people define individual
property rights in land, they often use their land as the means of access to
adjacent common resources, effectively "piggybacking" the use of a common
resource like air or water onto their individual land ownership. This practice
is not a problem so long as the common resources are relatively uncongested.
As with individual property rights, there is no particular need to assert and
formalize public rights in common resources, as long as the resources remain
plentiful. Thus, it does not matter if one landowner disposes of small
quantities of wastes in a fast-flowing stream, as long as the water can aerate
and biodegrade the wastes. Similarly, no one cares much if a single
landowner bums wood or coal if the amounts of smoke are small and quickly
dispersed.
But where population becomes dense, these unrestricted private uses of
the "commons" can become a problem. That is why London had restrictions
on burning coal as long ago as the thirteenth century. 4 That is why early
IND. L. REv. 329 (1995), contests the idea that public rights can be characterized as prop-
erty - meaning individual property. Id. at 341-42. She correctly emphasizes the important
role of public rights in traditional common law. Id. at 345-47 (discussing public nuisance).
23. See Rose, supra note 20, at 745. For the general duty of riparian owners to avoid
"any works which render the water unwholesome or offensive," see JOSEPH K. ANGELL,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES §§ 136-40, at 231-41 (7th ed. 1877). For the
long-standing prohibition on the fouling of public waters, see id. § 555, at 722-23. See also
People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1156, 1158-59 (Cal. 1884) (dumping
of debris washing into navigable stream is public nuisance, in spite of long usage); Gerrish
v. Brown, 51 Me. 256, 262 (1863) (using river to dump debris deemed to be public nui-
sance); Rogers v. Kennebec & P. R.R., 35 Me. 319, 324 (1853) (railroad company held
liable for damages for causeway that obstructed navigation). But cf. Commonwealth v.
Ruggles, 10 Mass. 391, 393 (1813) (private fishing nets obstructing passage of fish held not
within statute that prohibited permanent structures disrupting fish passage).
24. FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
156 (2d ed. 1990).
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nineteenth-century American states restricted access to shellfish in their
waters.' That is why late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
American law increasingly recognized rights of action for nuisance against
landowners who caused undue smoke, fumes, noise, water pollution, and
even loss of light and air - private nuisance in the case of nearby and
specially affected owners and public nuisance in the case of the larger public
or numerous members of it.26
These legal developments exemplify the general pattern: Increasing
congestion in common resources is a major reason for the evolution of legal
definitions of property rights because greater congestion alters the costs and
benefits of establishing property rights. Specifically, greater congestion
makes it worth the cost and effort to define property rights more explicitly.
American property law, like the law of most of the world, has always
responded to increasing conditions of congestion so as to avoid strife and
waste and has done so by redefining both private and public rights.
25. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550-53 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)
(upholding New Jersey's restriction of oyster gathering to state citizens).
26. For the subjects of private nuisance, see, e.g., Hurlbut v. McKone, 10 A. 164, 165-
67 (Conn. 1887) (steam planing-mill producing excessive noise, shavings and sawdust, smoke
and cinders, and vibrations held to be nuisance); Miley v. A'Hearn, 18 S.W. 529, 529-30
(Ky. 1892) (privy within 10 feet of plaintiff's well and 13 feet of daughter's bedroom resi-
dence deemed nuisance); Hayden v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214, 215-16, 224-25 (1866) (breeding
of mares with jacks [jackasses] and stallions within sight and hearing of dwelling and within
view of public street held to be nuisance). Note that the presence of the street made the last
case eligible for treatment as a public nuisance as well. Hayden, 37 Mo. at 216. For cases
on public nuisances, see, e.g., State v. Luce, 32 A. 1076, 1076-77 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1885) (defining public nuisance injury instructions as one affecting people of neighborhood
or those traveling on public road; defining citizens of neighborhood as "so many of them as
contradistinguishes them from a few"). Though it was often repeated that a use could not be
abated as a fiuisance unless the damage was real and serious, it did not have to be actually
dangerous to be enjoinable. See, e.g., Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 139,
144 (1867) (noting that offensive odors need not actually cause disease to be "common nui-
sance"; "if it is detrimental to the comfort of those dwelling around it, and to the passers-by,
it is a [common] nuisance, and may be abated"); Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 583
(1876) (treating disruption of enjoyment of ornamental shrubs and plants as nuisance). By
the end of the century, the courts in New York were ready to recognize that a structure dis-
rupting light and air from the street interfered with a property right. See Newman v. Metro-
politan Elevated Ry., 23 N.E. 901, 902 (N.Y. 1890). Perhaps because private uses are likely
to have spillover effects on common resources, courts regularly have held use rights subject
to greater public responsibility. See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of
Property, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 41-42, on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (distinguishing between "apparent" judicial model
of absolute property and "operative" model requiring community responsibility in property
use rights).
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I mentioned that landowners may "piggyback" uses of common
resources onto their individual property, and pigs themselves are a case in
point. Pigsties are noisy and smelly, but they used to be a part of the Amer-
ican urban landscape. Private landowners kept pigs on their property or let
them roam the streets, even in big cities like New York.27 As those cities
grew, however, pigs and pigsties became increasingly frequent targets of
nuisance suits.28 These suits now are virtually nonexistent in urban areas.
Why? Because private landowners' nuisance actions have been superseded
by general public legislation about animals.
Pigsties, in a way, are representative of the ways in which public and
private rights change in response to congestion: At first, when clean air is
not in short supply, landowners enjoy a regime of "anything goes" or open
access; they can keep pigs and other intrusive uses on their land, with all
the attendant noise and odors that fill the air, if they want. Those noises
and odors do not really matter, so long as there is little competition for the
air. But as more people move in, nuisance law emerges to hold these
owners to account to their neighbors and to the public - at least on an ex
post, case-by-case basis.29 And, finally, legislatures take over and regulate
ex ante, and in much greater detail, the areas where landowners can and
cannot locate their pigsties, their brick kilns, and other such problematic
uses. The legislatures do this in order to systematize public rights ex ante,
making their enforcement more uniform and predictable for private
landowners.
Proposition 5.
Public rights have co-evolved with private rights.
Traditional Anglo-American law generally recognized a duty of legisla-
tures to compensate owners when private rights were appropriated for the
public benefit. At all levels of government, compensation was and con-
tinues to be the norm, for example, when land is taken for roadways. On
the other hand, compensation was contingent on several defenses. For
example, unless land was taken outright, compensation was generally not
due when legislation imposed moderate but more or less equal burdens on
27. Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 899, 901-02, 921-24.
28. 2 H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NuisANcEs § 586, at 792-
93 (3d ed. 1893) [hereinafter WOOD ON NuIsANCE] (discussing pigsties as nuisances).
29. It is notable that in the 1893 edition of WOOD ON NUIsANCE, the author did not con-
sider pigsties in the city as nuisances per se but only when ill-kept and, consequently, smelly
or noisy. Id. Thus, pigsties could only be enjoined on a case-by-case basis.
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large numbers of landowners.' Nor was compensation due when regulation
was implicitly recompensed by reciprocal benefits going to the affected land-
owners.
31
Most important, compensation was not due when regulation effec-
tively prevented private owners from doing something to which they were
not entitled. Thus traditional American law did not necessarily regard land
ownership as a license for a landowner's unrestricted "piggybacked" use of
adjacent diffuse resources such as water, air, or wildlife, particularly in
situations in which one landowner's use could have serious effects on many
other owners and persons. Such an act was considered an encroachment
on the rights of others, and its restraint was not necessarily a compensable
event.
Immediately neighboring landowners or other easily identifiable people
might protect themselves through private trespass or nuisance law, each
bringing an action in his or her own behalf.32 In some ways, however, the
matters of more pressing concern were actions that affected the diffuse and
less recognizable general public, whose collective interests might be great
even though their individual interests were too minor for any of them to
bring an action. These diffuse interests were the particular domain of public
rights, and legislatures were widely considered their guardians. Massachu-
setts, for example, first as a colony and then as a state, prohibited as a
"common nuisance" any unauthorized obstructions to fish passage in its
rivers.33 This law attempted to protect the then-prolific runs of anadromous
30. This occurred either through taxes or through legislative authorizations of public
nuisance, which can be likened to an in-kind tax. See infra text accompanying notes 42-47.
31. See, e.g., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540-47 (1914) (up-
holding barrier pillar law that required coal companies to maintain coal walls between mines
in order to prevent flooding). This case was discussed as an instance of reciprocal benefits
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also Welch v. Swasey,
214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (noting that state court justified building height limits as protecting
adjacent buildings from fire).
32. For a useful discussion of the differences between nuisance and trespass, see gen-
erally Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Detennining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
33. The statute is discussed in Commonwealth v. Ruggles, 10 Mass. 391, 393 (1813).
Massachusetts' public protection of fisheries was very extensive and extended to non-nav-
igable waters. Some other states, such as New York, limited the protection of fish to nav-
igable waters. See People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 213-14 (N.Y. 1819) (denying applicability
of requirement that dam add fish ladder where dam crossed non-navigable stream and where
original grant had not preserved fishery). American definitions of "navigable" are quite
broad, however, and have included such uses as the floating of logs and canoes in turbulent
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shad and Atlantic salmon, widely used for foodstuffs; the legislature effec-
tively treated these fish as public property over which it was entitled to
dispose in the public's behalf. When the state did permit the major dams that
drove the new textile mills in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, it required the
builders to install rudimentary fish ladders in an unfortunately unsuccessful
effort to preserve public and private fishing rights.' By the turn of the
century, as recreational wildlife uses became more important, many states
recognized recreational fishing and hunting as part of the "public trust" uses
of navigable waterways and forbade private owners from interfering with
such public uses.35
Such legislative protections of general public rights were not occasions
for compensation. Rather, the public was regarded as a kind of beneficial
owner of diffuse resource rights, even though the legislature might assert
public rights in different ways under differing conditions of congestion. And
unless a private use was officially authorized as a net public benefit, a private
owner's appropriation of diffuse but congested resources was considered an
act of unjust encroachment, which could be abated as a public nuisance.36
Proposition 6.
Courts traditionally have protected evolving public rights.
Recent Supreme Court "takings" cases have shown considerable attention
to the importance of historic property categories, including the traditional
background concept of public nuisance, which is discussed in the 1992 case
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.37 As the Lucas Court remarked,
the mere invocation of "public nuisance" is not an excuse for public appro-
priation of private property.3 s Indeed, it never was, but earlier courts
or shallow waters. See Rose, supra note 20, at 764 and sources cited therein.
34. See THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE
WATERS OF NEw ENGLAND 174-75 (1991) (discussing one such ladder in Massachusetts).
The need for fish passage was recognized only belatedly, and the fishways were not very
successful. Id. at 175.
35. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Parker, 200 S.W. 1014, 1017 (Ark. 1917)
(stating that hunting and fishing on navigable waters is public right); Ainsworth v. Munos-
kong Hunting & Fishing Club, 116 N.W. 992, 993 (Mich. 1908) (discussing right to hunt
fowl on navigable waters); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 815, 820 (Wis. 1914)
(explaining that navigable waters are public waters that should be open for all to hunt and
fish).
36. For examples, see Halper, supra note 22, at 348-50.
37. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
38. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
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stressed their willingness to accept reasonable legislative definitions of
nuisance,39 which is another way of saying that they would accept reasonable
legislative protections of public rights.
At least two points, however, have been insufficiently recognized in
recent takings cases. First, historic American law took into account the need
for changes in the protection of public rights as resources became more con-
gested.4" Second, legislatures were recognized as playing a central role in
making those changes.4
Nuisance law was a primary protector of public rights, and nuisance law
itself was at its most active stage of development in the late nineteenth
century when urbanization and new technology set the stage for numerous
conflicts over land uses. A part of the nuisance story was a very significant
byplay between legislatures and courts.
Throughout the nineteenth century, legislatures were widely recognized
as competent to define public nuisances so as to prevent private encroach-
ments on public rights, but they also could authorize encroachments on public
resources by private parties.42 And at a time of great commercial and indus-
trial innovation, when active land uses were often regarded as beneficial to
the community, uses that had been considered public nuisances indeed often
were authorized.43 These authorized nuisances included legislative permission
for municipalities to pollute water,' for manufacturing plants to raise the
39. See Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and Pollution: Some Intersections Between Law
and History, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 423, 434-36 (1975) (noting late 19th century legislative
practice of declaring smoke a nuisance) (citing and quoting Northwestern Laundry v. City of
Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491-92 (1916), which says that state, by itself or through its
municipalities, may declare dense smoke to be nuisance and that harsh effects on business are
not grounds to object unless enactment is "merely arbitrary").
40. See Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas
Case on Western Water Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 945 (1993) (noting Lucas Court's
attempt to "cut off" arguments that property law changes as circumstances change).
41. See Halper, supra note 22, at 344-51; John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of
Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 CoLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17-20 (1993) (criticizing Lucas
Court's failure to recognize traditional legislative role).
42. Halper, supra note 22, at 346.
43. Id. at 347-51; See, e.g., People v. New York Gaslight Co., 64 Barb. 55, 69-70
(N.Y. App. Div. 1872) (declaring gasworks' unwholesome smells not a nuisance where
authorized by statute, so long as works not negligently built or operated); Pittsburgh, C. &
St. L. Ry. v. Brown, 67 Ind. 45, 48 (1879) (declaring that when necessary for common good,
legislature may require act that would be nuisance on common -law principles, such as loco-
motive whistle at railway crossing). For the limitations on legislative authorizations of public
nuisance, see infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
44. See 2 WOOD ON NUISANCE, supra note 28, § 752, at 1042-45 & n.3 (noting that
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dams that disrupted and depleted fish stocks,45 and most notoriously, for
railway firms to pollute air and create noise and vibrations.'
As problematic as some of these authorized public nuisances may now
seem, the standard theory was one that still seems sound: Any encroachment
on public rights had to be justified by an even greater benefit to the public's
well-being. In that sense, the burden of the authorized public nuisance could
be seen as an in-kind tax - the citizens "paid" this tax not in money but in
the form of widespread, but relatively minor, property damage, which was
acceptable because the benefits constituted a net public improvement for
which the costs were widely shared.47
We can now see damage from these authorized public nuisances that may
not have been so obvious at the time,' but even by the end of the nineteenth
century, courts and legal scholarship noticed many problems. They partic-
ularly noticed problems in cases where the legislature authorized private
parties, like railroad firms, to make public improvements, but where the costs
seemed to fall especially heavily on certain other private persons. Perhaps
it was predictable that in the fastest growing and most congested of cities,
New York, the courts engaged themselves especially vigorously in the rising
legislature may authorize municipal sewerage, citing City of North, Vernon v. Voegler, 103
Ind. 314 (1885)).
45. STEINBERG, supra note 34, at 174-75 (noting that Massachusetts chartered dam at
Lawrence and required fish ladders that ultimately proved ineffective).
46. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1914) and
authorities cited therein. See also WOOD ON NUISANCE, supra note 28, § 53, at 1046-74;
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROADS § 212, at 719-20 (2d ed. 1894) (noting
that legislature could exempt railroad firms from liability for noise, soot, etc. that would
otherwise be nuisances, so long as they operated with due care, but could not relieve them
of obligation to compensate owners if they took private property).
47. Note, however, that the legislature could not authorize aprivate nuisance; for the
classic statement of this point, see Richards, 233 U.S. at 553, 557. See also Baltimore & P.
R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 331-32 (1883) (declaring that legislative
authorization cannot justify private nuisance); 2 WOOD ON NUISANCE, supra note 28, § 758-
59, at 1060-65 (declaring that authorization of public nuisance could not include taking of
private property). The distinction follows the distinction between a tax and a taking; the
authorization of a public nuisance - with harms that are diffuse but widespread - is com-
parable to a tax, while the authorization of a private nuisance harms a single individual and,
on classic takings theory, should be disallowed unless compensated.
48. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 34, at 194-95, 202-03 (describing authorities'
ultimately false optimism about ability to restock rivers with fish losses due to industry).
Nineteenth-century public officials may have shared what seems to be a widespread tendency
to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the risks of new technology. See generally
James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84
MICH. L. REv. 405 (1985).
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level of conflicts between private property owners and legislatively
authorized franchisees. 49 The result was a judicial brake on the legislative
authorizations that effectively "spent" public resources such as clean air,
clean water, wildlife, and quiet surroundings.
How was that brake applied? Basically, it was applied through the
deployment of private rights to protect larger public ones. According to
courts and commentators, the legislature could authorize public nuisances but
not private ones - it could authorize widespread nuisances but not those that
especially harmed particular individuals.5' Similarly, the courts ruled that
a legislative authorization could not justify negligent acts,5 ' and in general,
they carefully distinguished the legislature's authorization from the specific
(and damaging) choices of authorized private franchisees.'
The construction of New York's elevated trains was an especially im-
portant subject in this increasingly active nuisance law, and New York's
courts used it in such a way as to permit public improvements while insuring
that a fuller range of property rights would be taken into account. In major
innovations on nuisance law, the New York Court of Appeals both recog-
nized a right of light and air for the enjoyment of property - a development
that undoubtedly smoothed the way for later city building height restrictions
and zoning ordinances - and invented a nuisance damage remedy that now
seems strikingly modem.53
Through an evolving nuisance law, then, the later nineteenth-century
courts effectively enlisted private rights to restrain legislative giveaways of
the public rights in air, water, wildlife, and peace and quiet. Judicially cre-
ated nuisance law required that the legislative "expenditures" of public rights
49. See Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of
Appeals, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REv. 301, 334-37 (1990).
50. See supra note 47 and authorities cited therein (discussing distinction between
authorizing private nuisance and public nuisance).
51. Halper, supra note 49, at 310. For a lucid explanation of the negligence principle
in public nuisance generally, see Halper, supra note 22, at 346-47.
52. See Halper, supra note 49, at 336-37; see also 2 WOOD ON NUISANCE, supra note
28, § 753, at 1047-48 & nn.2, 1-2, § 757, 1057-59 (discussing judges' narrow readings of
legislature's authorization).
53. Story v. New York Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122, 156-62 (1882). For recognition
of a different aesthetic harm in an earlier private nuisance case, see Campbell v. Seaman, 63
N.Y. 568, 583 (1876) (declaring damage to enjoyment of ornamental plants actionable in
nuisance). For an excellent discussion of Story and its subsequent history, see Halper, supra
note 49, at 341-57. Halper makes a strong argument that this case anticipated by almost
ninety years the famous Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
Halper, supra note 49, at 349.
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at least take into account the costs to private property and at least weigh the
expected benefits of public giveaways against the costs of private damage that
results. Parenthetically, this history is a useful reminder to those of us who
favor the explicit recognition of public rights. It is a reminder that private
rights are important, too, and can place a restraining hand on a legislature's
careless squandering of public rights.'
In addition to a sharpened nuisance law, however, American judges of
the later nineteenth-century found a more direct restraint on legislative give-
aways in a newly minted "public trust" doctrine. Although the public trust
doctrine had been in play for several centuries, it took new life from the 1892
Supreme Court opinion Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.15 In state after
state, courts adopted Illinois Central's" position that public resources -
notably navigable waterways and adjacent lands - were "inalienable" public
resources and could not be transferred to private parties even by legislatures,
except in furtherance of public trust purposes such as navigation and recrea-
tion.56
Finally, late nineteenth-century courts were instrumental in legitimizing
the state legislatures' efforts to protect public rights (as opposed to legisla-
tive authorizations of private encroachments).' Though the measures are no
longer viable on Commerce Clause grounds, courts up to the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized state efforts to preserve stocks of wildlife.58 Although the
courts never questioned federal efforts to curb water pollution,59 they recog-
nized local measures to restrain and relocate sources of foul odors and
54. See Carol M. Rose, A Tale of Two Rivers, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1623, 1629 (1993)
(book review) (noting that private and public property rights made 19th-century industrialists
consider environmental costs).
55. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
56. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-54 (1892); see Rose, supra note
20, at 735-39 (discussing Illinois Central and subsequent state cases). Interestingly enough,
New York, which had a long tradition of plenary legislative authority over public trust prop-
erty, also joined other states in adopting the idea that the public trust was inalienable, even
by legislative act. See Rose, supra note 20, at 738-39 & n.133.
57. Humbach, supra note 41, at 11-13, 17-18.
58. Geer v. Connecticut 161 U.S. 519, 522-35 (1896), overruled on Commerce Clause
grounds in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). For the development of fish and
game commissions in the late 19th century, see JAMEs A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILD-
LIFE?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 179-
229 (1981). For a discussion of Congress' passage in 1900 of the Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31
Stat. 187 (1900) (partially repealed 1909) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)), also aimed
at preserving wildlife, see TOBER, supra, at 227-29.
59. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 14, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152
(1899) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)).
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smoke,' and in general, they approved an expanding scope of legislative
protections of public rights.
Indeed, the earlier dynamism of court-made nuisance law appears to
have gone into a period of relative quiescence after the turn of the century.
It was at this time that courts ceded to legislatures - especially local
legislatures, through zoning - the increasingly complex task of defining the
ways that land uses might be restricted as being unusually burdensome to the
neighbors or to the public at large.6
For this reason, it is particularly misleading to look simply to common-
law judicial definitions of nuisance as the basis for modem property rights.
For almost a century now, legislators - with judicial acquiescence - have
taken over the task of refining and specifying the range of acceptable land-
owner practices, once defined only by judicially administered trespass and
nuisance law on a case-by-case basis.62 By comparison, judicially defined
nuisance law now tends to be relatively crude and does not always reflect the
greater congestion of modem life, the greater information that we now have
about the effects of human activities on resources, or the more complex and
nuanced remedies that legislatures can devise to moderate those effects.63
We are much more aware today of the impact of human uses on common
environmental resources, but modem environmental laws are the successors
to traditional legislative protections of public rights - the London prohibi-
tions on coal burning, the early American restrictions on obstructions to
navigable waterways, the late nineteenth-century public assertion of
responsibility for protecting fish and wildlife stocks, and the whole panoply
60. Many major cities passed air pollution and refuse ordinances in the 1880s and later.
See Laitos, supra note 39, at 433-34. Perhaps best known, although for its constitutional
implications for the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather than for public nuisance, are the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). These cases in fact concerned a land-use issue,
and in them the Court upheld New Orleans's ordinance locating slaughterhouses, which were
notorious for their foul air, at a distance from population centers. Id. at 80-82.
61. FiSCHEL, supra note 11, at 179; Halper, supra note 49, at 318.
62. See Laitos, supra note 39, at 433, 436 (noting shift away from judicial to legislative
remedies by 1880s and describing judicial acquiescence in legislative nuisance definitions).
The most famous instance of judicial acquiescence in legislative definitions is Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365, 390-95 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance). See also
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1909) (upholding building height limits); Bove v.
Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 235-36 (App. Div. 1932) (citing local zoning
permission as indicator that plant was not a nuisance).
63. See William W. Fisher, Ill, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1405-
07 (1993) (describing nuisance benchmark for takings cases as "retrogressive"); see also
Halper, supra note 49, at 302 (suggesting that modem nuisance law forgot about advances
of earlier law).
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 265 (1996)
of public efforts to protect health, safety, and welfare from private overuse
of common air and water resources that are "piggybacked" onto private
property.
It would have been wasteful - a potential tragedy of the commons -
to allow individual private landowners to appropriate resources that were
effectively shared by many others. Such a regime would have led predictably
to a wasteful scramble by many individuals to capture as much as they could
of resources that none could capture completely. The tradition of public
rights allowed no such thing, as this brief overview has shown. Indeed, the
courts intervened even when legislatures seemed too willing to give up those
public rights to private individuals. But those same courts traditionally were
willing to allow the legislatures considerable latitude when they protected
public rights against private encroachment.
Proposition 7.
Prior private usage gives no permanent claim against public rights.
Although property rights clearly have changed over time, there is a
pattern to their change. The general pattern of the common law was to leave
property usages alone and not to bother enforcing rights to the letter, so long
as no conflicts arose. This pattern was efficient: Why raise a fuss when no
rights or resources are endangered? And it was also a way to encourage
neighborly resolutions. Indeed, many aspects of traditional American law
encouraged property owners to be generous in allowing members of the
public to use their land, for example, for hunting. The other side of the coin
was that with certain narrow exceptions, the public using the land acquired
no permanent rights over against the owner and could not continue indefi-
nitely if the owner changed his mind. The opposite rule, as one court ob-
served, would be "perverting neighborhood forbearance and good nature"'
and, as others added, would only encourage "churlish" behavior.'
But the same pattern applied to public rights. Private uses of public
rights were condoned as long as no damage was threatened, but the other
side of this coin was that the private owner acquired no permanent rights in
the public resource. The 1915 case Hadacheck v. Sebastian' showed how
64. Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 111, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). As discussed in this
case, the chief exceptions permitted public prescription of roadways and, to a more limited
extent, public squares. Id. at 126-27. See Rose, supra note 20, at 750-53.
65. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & THOMAS DURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS
§ 151, at 164 (2d ed. 1868); cf. Gore v. Blanchard, 118 A. 888, 891 (Vt. 1922).
66. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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this idea worked in the particular situation of private parties engaging in uses
that trenched on public rights. The case involved a private brickyard owner
whose facilities emitted smoke and fumes over the surrounding area, which
was initially relatively isolated.67 As Los Angeles grew up around the
brickyard, however, the city passed an ordinance forbidding the operation
of brick kilns within the city limits, and the owner was prosecuted for
violating it.' The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance and the conviction."
The case confirmed a commonplace from nineteenth-century property
law: A private owner could commit what would otherwise be a public nui-
sance so long as the surrounding areas were lightly populated and relatively
undisturbed, but public authorities could bar the use when the area became
more heavily populated and when the public was actually inconvenienced by
such private encroachments on public rights.7° Just as a private owner should
not suffer expropriation for the neighborly act of allowing the public to use
his land when it caused him no inconvenience, neither should the public's
rights be expropriated simply because a private party used common resources
at a time when those resources were not scarce or congested and when it
would have been "churlish" for public officials to try to prevent the private
use.
71
Hadacheck exemplifies the way that takings cases have incorporated
the basic principles of a traditional American doctrine of public rights: The
67. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405-06 (1915).
68. Id. at 404-05.
69. Id. at 412-14.
70. For earlier cases in this line, see, e.g., Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 241-43 (1873);
People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 46 N.W. 735, 737 (Mich. 1890); Ashbrook v. Com-
monwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 139, 142-44 (1867). Cf. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev.
Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (in bane) (declaring that developer must indemnify
cattle feedlot owner for cost of moving pre-existing feedlot from previously rural area).
For an article discussing this issue, see John D. Ingram, Coming to the Nuisance: Nor Shall
Private Property Be Taken Without.. ., 5 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 181, 187-88 (1985).
71. It was stated commonly that private parties could not acquire a prescriptive right
against the public to perpetrate a public nuisance. See, e.g., 1 WOOD ON NuIsANcE, supra
note 28, § 19, at 40-43, § 76, at 105-106 (declaring that there is no defense of prescriptive
right or "coming to the nuisance" for public nuisance). For rulings to this effect, see, e.g.,
People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1158-59 (Cal. 1884) (involving long-
standing mining waste); Ashbrook, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) at 140 (involving 30 year-old livestock
pens); New Castle City v. Raney, 6 Pa. C. 87, 89, 93-94 (1888) (involving ice floes from
old millpond) (citing Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274, 274-75 (1868) (involving noise and
debris from old planing mill)). One well-known brickyard case denied the "coming to the
nuisance" defense in a private nuisance case where the time of prescription had not yet run.
Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (1876).
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fact that private owners "piggybacked" a use of public resources onto their
private land uses did not give the owner any permanent rights to use those
diffuse public resources. More specifically, past private usage of public
resources was not necessarily an impediment to legislation that would protect
public resources in the future. Thus, pigsties, brick kilns, slaughterhouses,
and many other private landowners' uses were restricted as their damage to
clean air and other public resources became more acute.
Proposition 8.
The province of takings law is to balance transitional compromises.
As a practical matter, when legislatures begin the transition to protecting
public rights, there may be good reasons to take a cautious approach and to
avoid pressing public rights to the hilt, particularly in the case of pre-existing
uses. For one thing, the public authorities may be quite late in determining
that particular private land uses cause damage to other persons and to public
resources, or they may have suggested that these uses could continue. In the
meantime, owners may have innocently sunk capital into their land uses in
the expectation of being permitted to continue to consume public resources
like air, water, wildlife stocks, or even peace and quiet.' Halting such uses
may result in the deadweight loss of expenditures that the owner has already
made - deadweight in the sense that the expenditures become useless either
to the owner or to anyone else.73
72. Innocence is sometimes a tricky question. As with insurance, the prospect of
compensation may make the original user overinvest even when he or she knows that the
use will become incompatible with an eventual public use. This is the moral hazard
problem, recently much discussed in the literature of regulatory takings. For a review, see
generally William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
269 (1988).
73. For a nuisance analogy, see the well-known Spur Industries case, in which a
retirement community was permitted to enjoin the operation of a large but remote feedlot -
but only upon paying for the feedlot's removal costs. Spur Indus., 494 P.2d at 706-08.
As Donald Wittman points out, failure to require compensation to the nuisance-like activity
could encourage the developer to cause inefficient losses to the feedlot when the developer
might have avoided these costs by choosing a different location. See Donald Wittman, First
Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nuisance", 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
557, 566 (1980). Both Wittman, id. at 565-66, and Ingram, supra note 70, at 186-88, point
out that foreseeability has been an important factor in "coming to the nuisance" cases.
Foreseeability might well have been a sub silentio factor in Hadacheck as well because
brick kilns were commonly on the outskirts of cities; owners might have been thought to
take their chances that cities would expand in their direction. See Campbell v. Seaman, 63
N.Y. 568, 581, 584 (1876) (explaining that brick kilns normally locate near towns but that
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Indeed, disappointed or angered owners may take matters into their own
hands and act in ways inconsistent with the ultimate legislative goal. It is
possible, for example, that the stringent legal protections of historic build-
ings may have precipitated an outburst of arson attacks on historic proper-
ties.74 Less dramatic, but still extremely important, is the political resistance
that those landowners may mount against reform unless they are mollified.75
Thus, utilitarian considerations, along with fairness considerations compara-
ble to estoppel,76 may sometimes weigh in favor of compensating owners who
are required to cease their intrusions onto public resources. Unless they are
placated, these owners may destroy the very public resources that the public
is attempting to safeguard. At the same time, the preservation of the public
resources themselves, for all users present and future, speaks for limiting any
further private inroads.
Takings cases traditionally have deployed several techniques to manage
these competing considerations - to avoid unfairness, undue burdens, and
unforeseeable losses to individual property owners while at the same time
preserving the ability of legislatures to protect public rights as the need
evolves over time. Like all compromises, these are messy and fraught with
intellectual and even practical imperfections, but as in most other areas of
life, the adjustment of property relations has a considerable element of
"muddling through.' 77
For example, takings and due process considerations typically have
required that pre-existing uses be "grandfathered" into new legislation aimed
at protecting public rights.78 Zoning ordinances are one example. They
they cannot prevent neighbors from moving in and making reasonable use of own property).
74. For the arson problem in historic buildings, see Jonathan Walters, Arson: A
Heritage in Flames, HIsT. PRE SERVATiON, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 11, 11 (describing fire in
building that occurred immediately after notification of possible designation as historic
structure).
75. See GARY D. LiBECAP, CoNtRACnNG FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 19-26 (1989)
(describing resistance to efficient changes in property regimes).
76. For a reform of takings doctrine based on estoppel, see J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argu-
ments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 138-40
(1995).
77. See generally Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 79 (1959) (arguing that human capacities allow only successive limited
comparisons of alternatives rather than comprehensive rational approach).
78. Aside from securing owners' expectations, one fairness reason for this "grand-
fathering" is that the early private uses may well not have damaged public resources, such
as air, water, or wildlife, as much as the later uses of the same sort. In economic terms,
the marginal costs of early uses may still be low - unlike latecomers' added uses, which
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typically exempt pre-existing nonconforming uses, at least for some sub-
stantial period of time.79 Similarly, in state property jurisprudence, there
is much attention to what are called the "vested rights" of private property
owners to continue land development projects, even when the projects are
inconsistent with recent legislative change.8° The much-used phrase in
federal takings jurisprudence, "investment-backed expectations," aims to
identify and, if necessary, to indemnify the property owners who may suffer
particularly pointed losses, even from legislation that is otherwise a reason-
able effort to protect public rights.8 '
These judicial techniques are compromises, or rather, they are all the
same compromise. The compromise aims at protecting settled expectations,
avoiding the demoralizing of private owners who can establish their settled
expectations, and preventing the deadweight loss of pre-existing capital in-
vestments taken in good faith. Those are the aims with respect to regulated
individuals.
But the other aims of the compromise are public: to stave off private
evasions that might destroy resources important to the public; to permit
legislatures, over time, to adjust the protections necessary for the preserva-
tion of public rights and resources; and to obviate the need to compensate
owners beyond a point at which those owners should reasonably be expected
have increasing marginal costs. For the marginal cost/average cost disjunction in urban
growth, see generally George S. Tolley, The Welfare Economics of City Bigness, 1 J. URB.
ECON. 324 (1974). But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1030-31 (1992) (suggesting that devices like grandfathering may disallow prospective regu-
lation); Humbach, supra note 41, at 15-16 (criticizing Lucas Court for failure to notice
equitable differences between existing and prospective uses, as well as differences in their
cumulative damage to environmental resources). For a description of early judicial concerns
about continuing pre-existing uses in zoning, see Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification
of "Nature's Metropolis": The Historical Context of Illinois' Unique Zoning Standards, 12
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 576-77 (1992).
79. The constitutionality of imposing time limits on pre-existing nonconforming uses
is discussed in Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 152 N.E.2d 42, 44-46 (N.Y. 1958). One problem
with pre-existing nonconforming uses is the question of repair or alteration and whether such
changes are sufficiently substantial as to be equivalent to new construction. See Town of
Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 416 A.2d 388, 391-93 (N.J. 1980) (holding restaurant's
transformation to discotheque to be impermissible alteration of nonconforming use).
80. See, e.g., Clackamas County v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190, 192-93 (Or. 1973) (discus-
sing substantiality of landowner's investment needed to acquire "vested right[s]" to proceed
with project despite change in land-use regulation).
81. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8 (citing phrase in Penn Central); Penn Cen.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (discussing interruption of "invest-
ment-backed expectations" as factor in takings jurisprudence).
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to adjust their own expectations about what they can and cannot do on their
properties.
The pattern of compromise in takings cases historically has entailed
inquiries that are often detailed and fact-laden. In effect, takings cases
are rather like nuisance cases, but applied to governmental actions. Just
as courts in nuisance cases ask whether a private owner's use is compar-
able to other normal land use practices, so do courts in takings cases ask
whether governmental actions accord with other ordinary regulatory prac-
tices - practices that owners can normally anticipate.' As with nuisance,
takings cases are ex post and case-by-case - messy though this approach
sometimes seems - because the circumstances of individual owners and
their properties vary enormously, as do the conditions giving rise to regu-
lation.83
Perhaps most important, takings jurisprudence is like nuisance law in
that it can adjust to increasing congestion and new occasions for the asser-
tions of public rights. This flexibility is evident to some degree even in
recent Supreme Court cases, which have sometimes seemed particularly
inattentive to the subject of public rights and the legislative role in their
protection. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,84 for example, a
case that found a state coastal commission's action unconstitutional as a
taking of property, Justice Scalia nevertheless recognized that the public
may have a legitimate interest in protecting a view85 - a public resource
only relatively recently recognized as such.
Proposition 9.
Recent legislative redefinitions of takings upset the balance implicit in
takings jurisprudence.
Recent proposals for takings legislation purport to clean up the messi-
ness of takings jurisprudence and clarify property rights, but in fact, many
of these proposals do neither. Instead, many only complexify takings ques-
tions and disrupt traditional understandings of the relationship of private and
public rights.
82. Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Juris-
prudence - An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TNN. L. REv. 577, 590 (1990).
83. The need for case-by-case assessment reveals a problem in some of the "takings
assessment" legislation that requires ex ante generalized takings consideration rather than con-
sideration of effects on individual owners. See infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
84. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
85. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
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One approach is to require an advance assessment of the takings implica-
tions of proposed regulations. State takings legislation, so far, has largely
followed this model. However, several of the state assessment statutes and
proposals appear largely to track Supreme Court verbiage about takings,
suggesting that this legislation in large part simply asks the relevant assessors
to second-guess the courts - the very courts whose determinations change
steadily in order to adjust public and private rights.A6 Nevertheless, if kept to
a simple checklist, such ex ante assessments might help to remind regulators
of important private property interests at stake without unduly hampering the
regulatory process."
Considerably more complex and more problematic is the federal gov-
ernment's Executive Order 12,630,88 which was an early example of the
assessment approach. Unfortunately, it poses questions that are almost im-
possible to answer in advance. This Order requires federal agencies, in their
"takings" assessments, to identify particular properties affected, their present
uses, the economic impact on each, any offsetting benefits, and the duration
of the adverse effects89 - and all this concerns only the consideration of
economic impact, which by no means exhausts the Order's list.'
A moment's reflection suggests how much these questions will resist an
ex ante investigation, and what special difficulties they present for regulations
with broad but mild impacts - the very regulations that are often thought
fairer than those that single out particular owners. In such assessment
requirements, the detailed factual inquiries of takings jurisprudence simply
are shifted without being avoided, and indeed, they are shifted to a time
frame in which they are less likely to yield reliable answers.9 At best, such
overblown procedural requirements are simply wasteful and redundant, and
at worst they are a kind of harassment of regulators.
86. For a very explicit example, see Arizona's recently passed H.R. 2229, 42d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (1995), which amends the Arizona Code to require counties and county agencies to
comply with specifically named U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Id. §§ 2-3.
87. See John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty,
26 URB. LAW. 327, 343-44 & nn.65-70 (1994) (describing Washington state assessment
"checklist" with cautious approval).
88. Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 4.
89. Id. § 5(b).
90. For a summary of the Order's requirements, see Robin E. Folsom, Executive Order
12,630: A President's Manipulation of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause to
Achieve Control over Executive Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 639, 658-69 (1993).
91. See also Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 519, 521 (1994) (discussing state
review statute that requires agencies to undertake fact-specific review before facts are known).
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Another approach attempts to define legislatively what is and what is not
a regulatory taking, particularly by stating a threshold percentage of "diminu-
tion in value" - 10%, 30%, etc. - beyond which an owner must be com-
pensated. Recent congressional proposals in particular have chosen this
route.92 As a matter of policy, of course, it certainly seems to be within a
legislature's competence to determine that some particular regulatory program
is simply not worth a given level of loss to landowners. But if a legislature
wishes to impose such constraints on its own acts, it might better consider
them along with the other pros and cons of particular programs, rather than
dressing percentages up in the sanctimonious garb of constitutional rights that
sweep across all regulations - and that indirectly and retroactively amend
any legislation affecting property rights.93
Whatever else might be said of percentage limits, they ultimately fail to
clarify one of the central issues of takings jurisprudence. To posit a 10 % or
20% or 30% diminution in value as a taking still does not answer the question
that has always dogged the diminution in value test for regulatory takings -
"percent of what?"' That is, what is the underlying property to which the
loss in value is compared?95 Even where such percentage requirements are
92. See, e.g., House Property Protection Act, supra note 3, § 3(a); Senate Property Rights
Act, supra note 3, § 204(a)(2)(D). "Diminution in value" has been a ground for takings claims
since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), though its meaning is notori-
ously ambiguous, as was noted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), where the Court discussed the difficulty of deciding when a regulation has gone "too
far." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
93. See Martinez, supra note 87, at 339. The House bill, despite other problems, places
constraints on its own acts only with regard to specific programs. See House Property Protec-
tion Act, supra note 3, § 9(5) (defining application of law to several statutory sections, including
wetlands and endangered species protections, as well as to several statutes relating to water
allocations). Mississippi's new takings statutes also apply to specific regulatory programs, i.e.,
timber and agriculture. See H.R. 1541, 1995 Leg., Reg. Sess. (1995) (enacted March 16,
1995); see also Freilict & Doyle, supra note 3, at 3 n.8 (summarizing Mississippi takings
legislation).
94. This problem often arises with Mahon's "diminution of value" test. Mahon, 260 U.S.
at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For further explanation, see the classic discussion in Frank
I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1190-93 (1967) (describing difficulty of arriving
at "denominator" of property to which to compare loss).
95. The scope of underlying property rights was raised in Lucas, where the Court sug-
gested that if a new regulation removed all value from a property, compensation is due unless
the regulation concerns a limitation that "inhere[s] in the title itself" in the form of "background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29. These
phrases undoubtedly will produce much new litigation about the scope of property rights and
will not be clarified in the new takings legislation; indeed, similar phrases are sometimes in-
cluded in those proposals. See, e.g., Senate Property Rights Act, supra note 3, § 204(a)(2)(C).
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passed, one can predict that they will generate more litigation about almost
exactly the same question. Thus, on closer analysis, the percentage limits,
like the assessment legislation, generally only complicate, without solving,
the fact-specific inquiries that are so much a part of most takings jurispru-
dence.
Aside from these various "clarifying" efforts, a number of the new
legislative proposals implicitly or explicitly narrow the substantive scope
of public rights. One of the sharpest attacks on public rights is quite subtle.
This attack is contained in what seems to be a minor adjustment to the "per-
cent diminution" clauses in the major congressional bills, where it is stated
that the percentage applies to the value of the entire property, or to any
affected part or portion.96 This "portioning" approach has quite a history.
Among other things, it was mentioned by Justice Scalia in Lucas,97 urged
by Richard Epstein in a subsequent commentary on Lucas,98 rejected by
Justice Souter in Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construction Laborers
Pension Trust,' incorporated nonetheless into an opinion of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit," and apparently, finally borrowed by
congressmen or their staff for inclusion in the takings bills.
But this seemingly innocuous phrase masks a quite radical position and
would very much alter existing takings jurisprudence. Once property can
be divided into "relevant" portions, any diminution can be manipulated to
become a 30%, 50%, or even 100% diminution.' The phrase could
effectively mean that virtually any regulation with any adverse impact on
an owner's parcel could become an occasion for compensation, without
96. House Property Protection Act, supra note 3, § 3(a); Senate Property Rights Act,
supra note 3, § 204(a)(2)(B)-(D).
97. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
98. Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1374-77 (1993). It is notable, however, that in the
accompanying footnote, Epstein cites as examples of partial takings the destruction of real
property covenants. Id. at 1374 n.25. These are easily assimilable to traditional bars to
taking of title of specific real property interests or to takings of what Frank Michelman
described as specific contract-based expectations, whose taking is particularly "demoralizing."
See Michelman, supra note 94, at 1214-15.
99. Concrete Pipe and Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct. 2264,
2290 (1993).
100. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-72 (Fed. Cir. 1994). But
see id. at 1576-79 (Nies, J., dissenting) (arguing that partial takings analysis is inconsistent
with current law).
101. In fact, once the taking applies to a "portion," any discussion of percentage diminu-
tion becomes meaningless.
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regard to the owner's expectations and whether they were reasonable, 2 and
without regard to the public rights that might be at stake.
Equally serious are measures and proposals that limit or obfuscate the
defenses against takings charges. Occasionally, these limitations are quite
explicit; for example, one Montana bill would explicitly eliminate the
takings defense that a regulation protects public trust property. 103 More
frequently, however, these limitations operate more indirectly, particularly
by silently omitting traditional defenses. Executive Order 12,630 exem-
plifies one way of curtailing defenses by omission. It states that only "real
and substantial" threats to health and safety - as opposed to the traditional
unmodified trio of health, safety, and welfare - can justify regulation and
preserve it from takings charges. 1" Several state proposals, as well as
House Bill 925, take this indirect limiting tactic, omitting welfare justifica-
tions for regulatory actions."' House Bill 925 includes another defense, but
it is a quite truncated one: The bill adds that a regulation can overcome i
102. Justice Scalia's mention of this approach went on to speculate that a more moderate
position is the genuine rule - that the relevant property is defined by the ways in which a
state's property law has shaped owners' reasonable expectations about the "particular interest
in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
103. Montana H.R. 597, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(8) (1995).
104. Exec. Order No. 12,630, supra note 4, § 3(c); see Folsom, supra note 90, at 687-94
(citing various divergences between the Order - with its guidelines - and takings law); see
also Martinez, supra note 87, at 337 (describing certain state legislation as departing from
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence).
105. House Property Protection Act, supra note 3, § 5(a)(1). For the states, see, e.g.,
Wyo. STAT. § 9-5-302(a)(iii)(B)(V) (1995) (representing assessment-type statute exempting
actions to protect public health and safety but omitting actions to protect welfare); Delaware
S. 56, 137th Gen. Ass. §§ 1701(a), 1702 (1993) [hereinafter S. 56] (deeming 50% loss in
value to be taking requiring compensation unless regulatory program intended to "prevent
uses noxious in fact or demonstrably harmful to the health and safety of the public," but
omitting welfare). The language of this Delaware bill is very similar to the proposal of the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which calls for compensation in the case
of any reduction in fair market value of real property. PRIVATE PROPERTY PROTECTION ACT
§ 3(A) (Am. Legislative Exch. Council) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. The Delaware Bill
provides only the seemingly narrow exceptions for regulation of a "public nuisance in fact"
or a "demonstrable harm to the health and safety of the public." S. 56, supra, § 1702.
Though the meaning of "public nuisance in fact" is not clear in ALEC's model act, the
passage could be somewhat generously interpreted because a clause in the "Legislative Find-
ings and Declarations" section refers to a "public nuisance affecting the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare." MODEL ACT, supra, § 2(B) (emphasis added). The Delaware
bill did not include this opening section and, hence, appears to omit welfare as a justification.
S. 56, supra, § 1702.
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takings charge if it prevents an identifiable "damage to specific property"
of other owners - if it effectively wards off a private nuisance.
0 6
These shields for regulatory action may be laudable as far as they go,
but they by no means exhaust the defenses traditionally available to Amer-
ican legislatures. Consider what these very crabbed and untraditional limita-
tions would mean in practice. A land use causing odors that are disgusting
(but not provably illness-producing) could not be regulated without com-
pensating the offending owner; health and safety is not provably imperilled
and protection of "mere" welfare would not be a justification. Similarly,
land uses that cause water runoff and that inflict siltation, turbidity, and
fishkills on other waterfront users could not be regulated without compensa-
tion; the damage "merely" affects welfare and that damage might not be suf-
ficiently specific to particular properties. .If this kind of takings legislation
were to apply to the Clean Air Act,"°7 the acid rain provisions would become
suspect. Acid rain causes damage to wildlife and vegetation - again,
"mere" welfare - rather than to health and safety, and of course, that
damage is hard to identify with "specific" properties. The "polluter pay"
principle here gives way to the "pollutees pay" principle.
As a matter of fact, "mere" welfare damages - odors, noise, and
pollution damage to structures or to natural resources - are very likely
to be damage to other people's property, whether that property is spe-
cifically identifiable or not. That fact suggests how little concern the
takings legislation really has for property, despite the verbiage of property
rights.
Traditional jurisprudence allowed much greater leeway to legislatures,
allowing them to protect not only health and safety but also comfort,
convenience, and welfare in general, whether specifically identifiable to
particular properties or not. Indeed, economic logic suggests the reasons
for this traditionally expansive view. If a land use causes identifiable
damage to a specific property, the landowner can sue in her own behalf
under private nuisance law. If a land use causes substantial health or safety
106. House Property Protection Act, supra note 3, § 5(a).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993). House Bill 925, by its
own terms, does not apply to the Clean Air Act. House Property Protection Act, supra
note 3, § 9(5). Senate Bill 605 apparently does because its terms are much more general.
The bill states defenses somewhat differently, providing for a nuisance defense. Senate
Property Rights Act, supra note 3, § 204(d). Thus, limitations on production of acid rain
precursors would be compensable unless acid rain could be classified as a traditional
nuisance. This approach is highly problematic given the short time since the discovery of
acid rain effects.
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hazards, the public may well be so outraged that single individuals will sue
in the public's behalf or insist that public officials do so. But if a land use
causes more diffuse and less identifiable damage to welfare - the thousand
small cuts into clean water, fresh air, plentiful fish and wildlife and quiet
surroundings - then members of the general public have only attenuated
incentives to sue in their own behalf."8 Each person and property owner
shares the problem with many others, and all may await the action of some-
one else. Hence, the general public, faced with diffuse and hard-to-define
damage, is most in need of the legislative protection of public rights.
Following this logic, legislative protection of wide and diffuse public rights
traditionally has been considered a part of the police power, rather than
takings of private property.
Indeed, there is a relation between standing doctrines and the police
power: Private individuals may not be appropriate advocates for a broad
public interest because their personal interests are slight; hence, they do not
have standing. But the quid pro quo is not that broad public damage goes
undefended. The quid pro quo is that the public's agents - its legislative
and regulatory agencies - are entitled to protect against damage to the
public. That is the traditional position of public rights.
Contrary to these historical patterns, the new proposals on takings go
far beyond the constitutional protections of private ownership, even as those
protections are set out in the takings jurisprudence of our recently more
conservative Supreme Court. That is why this kind of legislation could
seriously disrupt the balancing effort of takings jurisprudence - the balance
between the protections of private rights and public rights.
Proposition 10.
Proposed legislative redefinitions of takings impair public rights and
dissipate resources.
Some of the proposed takings redefinitions, if enacted, will effectively
transfer public rights to private owners. They will do so by expanding the
definition of a taking, by narrowing the legislature's defenses against takings
charges, and by adding duplicative procedures whose costs can delay and
impede legitimate legislative action. More important, they will do so
108. Even when individuals overcome the problem of attenuated interest in diffuse
damage, problems of standing may impede their legal effectiveness. See, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-67 (1992) (holding that environmental group and
its members have no standing to require Secretary of Interior to adopt regulations applying
environmental review to federal actions outside United States).
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without any semblance of the older justifications for legislative authoriza-
tions of encroachments on public rights - that the public good, on balance,
was served by the authorization. 09
Quite the contrary, these transfers suggest a net social impoverishment.
Like private rights, public rights have an economic justification: They main-
tain unified control over large-scale, common-pool resources. By cutting
back on that unified control and allowing unrestricted open access to individ-
uals, though we may chant the name of property rights, we are in effect
inviting a wasteful free-for-all in common resources - the very opposite
of the aim of a property regime.
Modern scholarship suggests some special reasons for concern about
legislative transfers of public rights to private interests: These transfers are
not likely to be reversed easily. Whatever the problems with judicial takings
remedies, they can at least adjust as a pattern of cases emerges. But the
situation could well be different for takings legislation. First, the academic
literature of "public choice" argues that in legislatures, interest groups that
are concentrated and intense have a bargaining advantage over large, diffuse
interests. 10 If true, this pattern suggests that land and resource developers
of all kinds - timber companies, miners, real estate developers, and agri-
cultural interests - are likely to receive special favor in legislatures,
particularly when the interests arrayed against them are large and diffuse."'
What this means, of course, is that public rights are always in a somewhat
precarious situation in legislatures, which may be the reason why so many
courts still seem to find the public trust doctrine attractive." 2 Second, the
academic literature from cognitive psychology argues that once a special
favor is granted and turns into a new status quo, the beneficiaries will be
especially unlikely to give it up. This phenomenon is known as the "endow-
109. Even with these justifications, earlier courts used private nuisance law and the
public trust doctrine to police legislative giveaways of public rights. See supra text accom-
panying notes 55-56.
110. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
723-24 (1985) (noting that "discrete and insular minorities" have advantage over diffuse inter-
ests in pluralist politics). For the classic statements, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) and MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
111. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 279, 293, 297 (1992) (noting that landowners generally wield more influence in legisla-
tures than ordinary taxpayers).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56; see also Rose, supra note 20, at 713-16,
729-30 and authorities cited therein.
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ment effect": People are more attached to things that they have than to
prospective things they might, but do not now, have.
1 13
Endowment effects, added to the ordinary legislative patterns of public
choice, suggest that it would be especially difficult to reverse the transfers
of public rights implicit in the new taldngs proposals. To a certain degree,
we can already discern this pattern in the enormous difficulty that Congress
has encountered in modifying agricultural supports and water subsidies,
environmentally damaging though these may be."14
The modem legislative transfers would mean, of course, that the public
would have to pay for resources that it has traditionally owned - and has
owned for very good reason. This would be a poor idea in any time, but
it is particularly disturbing that these proposals have arisen at a time when
the national deficit is at an all time high. The alternative, of course, is that
the public would not repurchase its rights. But that does not really alter the
picture. Such transfers still effectively drain resources away from future
generations of American citizens. This dilemma is again reminiscent of the
deficit problem, insofar as the current generation of children will be impov-
erished by our present "expenditures" of public rights - by their giveaway
to private persons who have no particular incentive to maintain public
values.
Most important, however, is a quite different factor. A pattern of such
transfers encourages disrespect for public rights and encourages private
property owners to adopt an attitude of extortion and "in-your-face" about
matters of known concern to the public. Property as a whole depends
greatly on a civilized respect for the rights of others, including rights of the
public. Citizens should expect that their legislators will avoid measures that
can disrupt respect for public rights and that could instead reward persons
who had no reason to expect that they could indefinitely appropriate public
resources for themselves.
Proposition 11.
Legislatures nevertheless can play an important role in bringing private
property concepts into the preservation of public rights.
There is no question that many of our environmental and land use laws
could use improvement, both from the perspective of cost effectiveness and
113. See generally Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonrevers-
ible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989).
114. Ronald Smothers, Bright Prospects on Georgia Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995,
at A6 (describing Congress' difficulty in phasing out agricultural support system).
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from the perspective of fairness to individual owners. There is a relation-
ship between these points; legislatures that can treat other people's property
as a "free good" may not have much incentive to weigh costs and benefits
accurately. 1 5 There are many examples: Local governments can act cav-
alierly in allowing - or prohibiting - land uses that primarily damage
outsiders." 6 Federal laws, with their distance from specific local condi-
tions, may be so optimistic about the efficacy of general legislation as to call
for impracticable or unenforceable levels of performance, which leaves
citizens confused and frustrated about their rights and duties." 7 Environ-
mentalists should learn a lesson from the property rights backlash that has
whipped up the recent takings proposals; the cavalier treatment of private
rights is very likely to have serious repercussions that ultimately can damage
public rights as well.
Specific legislation to deal with these concerns can make regulation
both fairer to individual citizens and more productive to the larger com-
munity. Indeed, in focusing on takings jurisprudence - which is so dom-
inated by the judiciary - we often overlook the fact that legislatures police
each other in ways that can allay takings claims from the outset. For
example, a number of states require that local regulation undergo a variety
of planning steps, in part to improve regulatory quality, in part to give
citizens an early opportunity to raise fairness concerns about land use
regulation, and in part to prevent municipalities from imposing external
costs on one anothers' citizens.11s
Just as important, legislatures often have created limited property rights
in order to preserve environmental resources. Since the late nineteenth
115. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1985) (arguing that if government never has to compensate, it has
no incentive to care for private property, leading to overregulation).
116. For example, municipal patterns of "exclusionary zoning" often are described as
efforts to foist responsibility for low-income residents on others; a good example is the
famous Mt. Laurel litigation, beginning with Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 731-34 (N.J.) (requiring city to zone for "fair
share" of region's low-income housing), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See also
FIsCHEL, supra note 11, at 340 (describing Mount Laurel litigation as addressing problem of
"local parochialism").
117. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
1996) (manuscript at 28, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (book review).
118. See, for example, the "housing element" requirement in California, CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 65580-65589 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995), which requires localities, inter alia, to
plan for housing for all economic groups of the community and to meet their respective shares
of regional housing needs.
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century, for example, legislatures have passed measures to charge for the
right to hunt and fish through licensing requirements. These measures give
hunters a limited property right while helping to limit demand on the
underlying resources." 9 The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act opened
up another and extremely valuable experiment in quasi-property rights by
effectively privatizing a large portion of the United States' sulphur dioxide
emissions."2 The tradeable emission rights established under that program,
however, are bounded; they limit emissions to relatively small amounts that,
when added up, yield a total amount that is not considered dangerous to the
public health and welfare.
Because they are bounded and finite, permits and emission rights of this
sort are quite in keeping with traditional ideas of private property. Legis-
lative approaches like these differ markedly from the proposed legislative
takings redefinitions. Some of the latter would effectively hand over
unrestricted rights and permit open encroachment on public resources simply
on the basis of ownership of land. Under such measures, land ownership
becomes the basis for "piggybacked" rights to use or damage common
resources with impunity. That pattern effectively recreates a tragedy of the
commons in the diffuse land-adjacent resources of air, water, and wildlife
stocks.
Limited tradeable emission rights, by contrast, have the virtues of tradi-
tional private property rights. Rather than giving carte blanche to an entire
resource, they are closely bounded in scope. Once allocated, they can be
traded and hence allow a range of private choices; and they encourage thrift,
planning for the future, and attentiveness to the rights of others.
Legislative definitions of this sort - limited private rights in diffuse
public resources - could be immensely valuable both for the preservation
of public resources and for the security of private ownership. Anyone
genuinely interested in securing property rights might well consider how
these limited, legislatively created property rights can be deployed to pre-
serve the environmental resources - water, air, and wildlife - that so often
set off takings disputes.
119. TOBER, supra note 58, at209.
120. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399,
2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7651-7651o (Supp. V 1993)). Strictly speaking, trade-
able emission rights are not property rights in air in the sense that the holder can exclude
others from some portion of the air; they are, rather, limited rights to pollute the air - to use
the air as storage for wastes.
53 WASH. &LEE L. REV 265 (1996)
Proposition 12.
Public rights are as essential to a free enterprise system as are private
rights.
In a free enterprise system, public rights measure in importance beside
private rights. Both kinds of rights are important because the goal of a free
enterprise system, all other things being equal, is not to maximize the value
of privately held resources. It is to maximize the value of the sum of private
and public resources.
Much of the literature of the takings debate points out the dangers to
private owners from uncompensated public appropriations. These dangers
are real. Public appropriations can unfairly single out particular private
owners to pay for public benefits, and writ large, they mean that we could
impoverish ourselves as a nation by discouraging enterprise and undermin-
ing commerce. For this reason, we have constitutionalized judicial over-
sight of public regulation through the Takings Clause.
Handouts of public rights to private owners, however, are unfair to the
public. They too can impoverish us as a nation because they decimate
resources that are diffuse and difficult to turn into private property but that
are still immensely valuable to the public as a whole - now and (it is to be
hoped) in the future. Citizens are entitled to expect that their legislatures
will safeguard public rights along with private ones and in so doing, uphold
the respect for rights - including public rights - that is a necessary part
of the moral infrastructure of any property regime and, indeed, of republi-
can government itself.
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